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a private component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic
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private. Indeed, we show that in the two-groups contest, for most degrees of pri-
vateness of the prize, the large group uses its sharing rule as a mean to exclude the
small group from the competition, a situation called monopolization. Conversely,
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1 Introduction
Collective contests where group members organize and compete for a prize are a com-
mon phenomenon: research and development races, procurement contests, funds to be
allocated among different departments within a university, regions within a country or
countries in the EU, projects allocated among different divisions of a firm, party members
who participate in pre-electoral campaigns, or even sport and art contests. Often, one
can interpret the prizes sought by competing groups as a mixture between a public and
a private good. Regional governments competing for a budget typically use the latter to
provide both monetary transfers and local public goods. Likewise, prizes in research and
development races involve both reputational and monetary benefits for the winning team.
More generally, any contest between groups for a monetary reward can be considered as
involving a public good component as long as the winners enjoy some benefits in terms
of status, reputation, or satisfaction related to the victory.
An important feature of collective contests is that groups’ performance depends on
individual contributions of their members. University departments usually receive their
funds depending on the publication record of the department, which is determined by the
individual publications of its members. Therefore, groups face the need of coordinating
and establishing some rules regarding their internal organization. As pointed out by
previous literature, one of the most relevant decisions in this respect concerns the way
the private component of the prize is shared among groups members in case of victory.1
In this paper we consider a standard model of collective rent seeking allowing for the
contested prize to be a mixed public-private good. We analyze how the nature of the prize
affects the strategic choice of sharing rules and thus individual incentives to contribute to
their group effort, which may ultimately give rise to the occurrence of two phenomena:
(i) monopolization and (ii) the group size paradox (GSP henceforth). In the context
1Starting with Nitzan (1991), the literature has considered both exogenous and endogenous sharing
rules, while it has assumed that the choice of such rules may occur under either public or private
information. For a recent survey on prize-sharing rules in collective rent seeking, see Flamand and
Troumpounis (2015).
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of two-groups contests, monopolization refers to a situation in which one group retires
from the competition (Ueda, 2002). While such a situation can never be an equilibrium
when the contestants are individuals, it may occur in collective rent seeking to the extent
that the members of the active group are still competing for the private part of the prize
within the group. On the contrary, the GSP refers to a situation in which a smaller group
outperforms a larger one in terms of winning probabilities. The notion of the GSP dates
back to the seminal work by Olson (1965), who stressed the severity of the free-rider
problem within large groups. In the context of collective rent seeking with endogenous
sharing rules, the occurrence of the GSP has been studied by Nitzan and Ueda (2011).
We contribute to the literature on the strategic choice of sharing rules by analyzing
the case of intermediate degrees of privateness of the contested prize. This literature
has focused extensively on the extreme case of a purely private contested prize, while
considering that the choice of sharing rules may be either restricted or unrestricted.
If it is restricted, a situation to which we refer as “bounded” meritocracy, the private
component of the prize can be allocated among group members at most proportionally
to individual contributions (Baik, 1994; Lee, 1995; Noh, 1999; Ueda, 2002). On the
contrary, if the choice of sharing rules is unrestricted (i.e., meritocracy is “unbounded”),
the group may decide to allocate the private part of the prize in such a way that worse-
performing group members pay a transfer to better-performing group members (Baik
and Shogren, 1995; Baik and Lee, 1997, 2001; Lee and Kang, 1998; Gu¨rtler, 2005).2 As
we discuss later, it turns out that if the groups were able to choose whether to restrict
the level of meritocracy of their sharing rules, they would (weakly in some instances)
never do so regardless of the exact nature of the prize. Hence, the very fact that the
unconstrained choice of sharing rules in both groups always arises endogenously as an
equilibrium constitutes a justification for departing from the assumption of bounded
2These transfers are analogous to the ones proposed in individual contests by Hillman and Riley
(1989). Recent literature has considered cost-sharing in collective contests for purely public prizes,
which can also be interpreted as within-group transfer schemes (Nitzan and Ueda, 2014; Vazquez, 2014).
Nitzan and Ueda (2014) provide several examples of situations involving transfers among members of a
group, in contexts such as labor unions, ethnic conflicts, or academic institutions.
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meritocracy. The other extreme case where the prize is a pure public good —and thus
sharing rules do not apply— has been analyzed by Baik (1993, 2008). However, as we
pointed out with the above examples, prizes in collective contests are likely to involve
both a public and private component.
We show that allowing for a mixed public-private prize in collective rent seeking
dramatically alters the nature of competition and incentives with respect to the extreme
cases of a purely private or public contested prize. In particular, we show that unbounded
meritocracy yields monopolization for most intermediate degrees of privateness of the
prize. In contrast, monopolization never arises in collective contests when the prize is
purely private or purely public, even when allowing for meritocracy to be unbounded
(Baik and Lee, 1997).
Our analysis also contributes to the understanding of the occurrence of the GSP,
which has been studied recently in the context of collective contests with a mixed public-
private prize by Esteban and Ray (2001) and Nitzan and Ueda (2011). While Esteban
and Ray (2001) assume exogenous and fully egalitarian group sharing rules, Nitzan and
Ueda (2011) extend their analysis by considering the possibility of endogenous sharing
rules. However, they assume that the information regarding such rules is private, hence
their choice does not involve a strategic interaction between groups. In this paper, we
consider an additional factor that may further affect the occurrence of the GSP, namely
the strategic choice of sharing rules in a setup of perfect information. In the imperfect
information setup of Nitzan and Ueda (2011), a higher level of meritocracy in a group
induces higher levels of individual effort by its members. In our perfect information setup,
a more meritocratic sharing rule not only induces higher levels of individual effort by that
group’s members, but it also discourages effort by the other group’s members. While the
GSP always arises in the case of exogenous and egalitarian sharing rules analyzed by
Esteban and Ray (2001) (except for a purely public good), it never does so in the context
of endogenous sharing rules under imperfect information considered by Nitzan and Ueda
(2011). By taking into account the additional strategic effects induced by the assumption
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of perfect information combined with the one of unbounded meritocracy, we show that
the GSP arises whenever the prize is sufficiently private.3
While it is often reasonable to think of groups’ internal organization (sharing rules)
as private information, our analysis applies to many other cases that are better described
by a situation of perfect information where the decisions regarding sharing rules are
potentially strategic.4 Think for instance of university departments competing for funds,
with the departments allocating part of these funds among their members according to
a publicly known incentive scheme. More generally, any competition taking place among
groups belonging to a common organization is often likely to involve common knowledge
of the individual incentive schemes within each group. Likewise, it is not unreasonable
to consider that in some instances, firms have some knowledge regarding the incentives
schemes of their competitors.
Two distinct effects relating to group size have to be taken into account in order to
understand our results. For a given level of privateness, the most direct effect of group
size is that it yields better odds at winning the competition between groups, since there
is a larger number of potential contributors. Put otherwise, if all individuals exert the
same level of effort, then the aggregate contribution is greater for the large group, and
so is its probability of winning the competition between groups. This is what we call
the aggregate effort effect, and it favors the large group regardless of the nature of the
contested prize. However, there is an additional effect related to group size that penalizes
the large group: a more numerous group implies that the private part of the prize has to
3While the two previous works provide further results on the influence of a convex cost of effort on
the elimination of the GSP, the introduction of a strategic choice of sharing rules obliges us to restrict
ourselves to the linear cost case. A convex cost of effort penalizes higher levels of individual effort, hence it
works against the occurrence of the GSP. Corcho´n (2007) provides an intuition for the latter:“Intuitively,
it is clear that Olson’s conjecture cannot hold if costs rise very quickly with effort: for instance if costs are
zero up to a point, say G¯ where they jump to infinity, all agents will make effort G¯ and smaller groups
will exert less effort than large ones.” Our conjecture is then that monopolization should also hold with
convex costs, while the GSP should be less likely.
4In fact, in the literature on collective rent seeking and sharing rules the assumption of perfect
information as in this paper is the usual one. To the best of our knowledge, the only papers analyzing
the case of private information are Baik and Lee (2007, 2012), Nitzan and Ueda (2011), Baik (2014) and
Nitzan and Ueda (2014). Monopolization never arises in that context, even when considering intermediate
degrees of privateness of the contested prize.
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be divided among more individuals. That is, if the good is (at least partially) private,
a larger group size also implies a lower individual share of the prize in case of victory.
This is what Nitzan (1991) calls the group-size deterrence effect. Clearly, this effect does
not apply to the public component of the prize given the non-exclusion and non-rivalry
properties of public goods.5
The relative size of these two effects ultimately determines the emergence of monopo-
lization and the GSP. As the group-size deterrence effect is stronger the higher the degree
of privateness of the prize, while the aggregate effort effect is independent of the nature
of the prize, it follows that the aggregate effort effect dominates the size deterrence ef-
fect whenever the public component of the prize is large enough. Indeed, if the prize is
sufficiently public (but not a pure public good), and if the groups can decide upon the
meritocracy level of their sharing rules without any constraint, then the large group takes
advantage of its size by selecting a very meritocratic sharing rule. This increases the in-
dividual contributions by its members while discouraging individual contributions by the
small group’s members, to the point of excluding the small group from the competition
—that is, monopolization occurs. However, when the degree of privateness of the prize
increases, the size deterrence effect gets larger, acting as a counterbalancing power to
the aggregate effort effect. When the prize is sufficiently private, the small group has an
interest in actively taking part in the competition. As the degree of privateness increases
further, the size deterrence effect exacerbates, thereby decreasing the attractiveness of
a potential victory from the perspective of the large group’s members. As a result, the
large group implements a less meritocratic rule than the small group, inducing relatively
lower levels of effort by its members, which ultimately drives the emergence of the GSP.
We start the analysis with the strategic choice of group sharing rules under unbounded
meritocracy, that yields the main results of the paper. If the prize is sufficiently public
(but not purely public), monopolization occurs and the small group retires from the
5Relaxing the property of non-rivalry by assuming that the public part of the prize is congestionable
does not qualitatively alter our results (see footnotes 16 and 17).
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contest. If the prize is sufficiently private the large group cannot exploit its size advantage,
so that the GSP occurs. We then proceed with the analysis of the strategic choice of
group sharing rules under bounded meritocracy. We show that in such case, neither the
large nor the small group can implement a sharing rule that allows them to fully exploit
their respective size advantage (i.e., size deterrence for the small group and aggregate
effort for the large group). As a consequence, neither monopolization nor the GSP arises
when meritocracy is bounded. In other words, the large (small) group needs to select
unbounded levels of meritocracy in order to fully take advantage of the aggregate effort
(size deterrence) effect. Yet, one can show that the members of both groups are generally
strictly better off when the choice of their respective sharing rules is restricted and the
strength of competition reduced accordingly. Therefore, even though the restricted choice
of sharing rules in both groups would never arise endogenously as an equilibrium, it turns
out that in most instances, it Pareto-dominates the case of unbounded meritocracy.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we
characterize the equilibrium of the second stage of the game, namely the individual choice
of effort for given group sharing rules. In Section 4, we solve for the endogenous choice
of sharing rules in the two groups under unbounded meritocracy, while in Section 5 we
focus on the case of bounded meritocracy. Section 6 concludes with a discussion. All
proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two groups i = A,B of size ni ∈ N such that ni > 1 and without loss of
generality A is the large group (i.e., nA > nB). Each member k = 1, ..., ni of group
i chooses his individual level of effort eki ≥ 0 whose cost is linear. The valuation of
the contested (divisible) good is the same for all individuals, and is denoted by V .6
6We abstract from the possibility of intra-group heterogeneity regarding lobbying effectivity, which
can be reflected in different valuations of the prize by the members. One can ask whether a group whose
members have highly unequal interests in the collective action will be more or less active. The literature
has provided contrasted answers to the latter question, due to the difference in the assumed form of
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Individuals’ choice of effort within each group takes place simultaneously given the sharing
rules.











j=1 eji denotes the aggregate effort of group i. Individuals are risk




















V − eki for EA = EB = 0
0 for Ei = 0, Ej > 0
(1)
for i = A,B and i 6= j. The parameter p ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of privateness
of the contested prize (p = 0 corresponds to the case of a pure public good while p = 1
corresponds to the case of a pure private good). The sharing rule αi is the relative weight
given to meritocracy (i.e., within-group relative effort, eki/Ei) as opposed to egalitarian-
ism in the allocation of the private part of the prize within the corresponding group.7 As
long as αi > 0, high performers in group i receive a larger share of the prize than low
performers, while if αi = 0, the private part of the prize is shared equally among group
members regardless of their relative contributions.
Previous literature on the strategic choice of sharing rules has considered both the
cases of αi ∈ [0, 1] (Baik, 1994; Lee, 1995; Noh, 1999; Ueda, 2002) and αi ∈ [0,∞) (Baik
and Shogren, 1995; Baik and Lee, 1997, 2001; Lee and Kang, 1998). The restriction that
αi ∈ [0, 1] implies that the allocation of the private part of the prize among group members
the effort cost function (see the discussion in Nitzan and Ueda (2013) and the references they cite).
Assuming very weak and plausible restrictions on the form of the effort cost functions, Nitzan and Ueda
(2013) show that if a group competes for a prize with sufficiently many rivals or with a very superior
rival, unequal stakes among the members can enhance its performance.
7Observe that 1/ni substitutes eki/Ei in (1) to avoid an indeterminacy for Ei = 0.
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can be at most proportional to individual contributions. On the contrary, a value of αi
larger than one permits higher levels of meritocracy. More precisely, the sharing rule
is such that it allows for transfers among individuals, as in Hillman and Riley (1989).




V according to relative effort within the group.8 In this paper we
analyze both the restricted and the unrestricted choice of sharing rules.
Our game consists in the strategic choice of the groups’ sharing rules, followed by
the simultaneous choice of individuals’ effort levels. The equilibrium concept is subgame
perfection in pure strategies.
3 Effort Stage
Before analyzing the strategic choice of group sharing rules, we first solve the last stage
of the game. At the effort stage, groups’ members decide their level of individual effort
by maximizing (1) subject to the condition of non-negative efforts. The equilibrium is
characterized in Proposition 1, which essentially extends the results of Ueda (2002) and
Davis and Reilly (1999) by allowing for a mixed public-private prize.
Proposition 1. Let χi(αA, αB) = (1−αi)p(ninj − nj)− (1−αj)p(ninj − ni)− ninj(1−
p)− pni with i = A,B and j 6= i.
• If p > 0 and αi > 0 for i = A,B then there exists a unique equilibrium in the effort
subgame. If χi(αA, αB) ≥ 0 for group i then χj(αA, αB) < 0 for group j and
eki = e˜i = 0 ∀k ∈ i ekj = e˜j = αjp(nj−1)n2j V ∀k ∈ j
If χi(αA, αB) < 0 for i = A,B then
eki = eˆi =
ΛiΦi
ni[njp+ni(2nj(1−p)+p)]2V ∀k ∈ i, ∀i = A,B
8Cost-sharing in collective contests for purely public prizes can also be interpreted in terms of within-
group transfers (Nitzan and Ueda, 2014; Vazquez, 2014).
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with Λi = [nj(1− p) + p] [ni(1− p) + p+ (ni − 1)pαi] + (nj − 1) [ni(1− p) + p] pαj and
Φi = njp(1− αi) + ni[nj(1− p(1− αi + αj)) + pαj ].
• If p = 0 or p > 0 and αi = 0 for i = A,B then there exist multiple equilibria where
Ei = nieˆi.
• If p > 0, αj > 0 and αi = 0 for j 6= i, then if χi(αA, αB) ≥ 0 there exists a unique
equilibrium where eki = e˜i = 0 ∀k ∈ i and ekj = e˜j ∀k ∈ j. If χi(αA, αB) < 0 there
exist multiple equilibria where ekj = eˆj ∀k ∈ j and Ei = nieˆi.
Expression χi(αA, αB) determines the occurrence of monopolization. More specifically,
when χi(αA, αB) ≥ 0, group i retires from the contest. This condition coincides with the
monopolization condition for a purely private prize found by Ueda (2002). As can be seen
from the analytical expression of χi(αA, αB), the more meritocratic is the sharing rule of a
group, the more likely that its members are active, as it provides higher incentives to exert
effort (equilibrium effort is increasing in the meritocracy of the sharing rule). Conversely,
more egalitarian sharing rules exacerbate free-riding incentives, so that individual effort
eventually drops to zero (i.e., monopolization arises). Furthermore, the more meritocratic
the sharing rule of its opponent, the more likely that a group retires from the competition.
Notice that if one of the groups is inactive, then all members of the active group are
guaranteed to enjoy the public component of the prize as well as the part of the private
component that is allocated in an egalitarian manner. Hence, in equilibrium members
of group j exert effort as if they were competing for a prize of valuation αjpV (i.e., the
private part of the prize that is distributed according to relative effort) in a standard




When the prize is not a pure public good and none of the two groups shares the prize
in a fully egalitarian manner (i.e., p > 0 and αi > 0 for i = A,B), there exists a unique
equilibrium that is within-team symmetric. On the contrary, when the prize is a pure
public good (p = 0) or when the sharing rule of at least one group is fully egalitarian
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(αi = 0 for any i = A,B), the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. These multiple
equilibria are identical to the ones studied by Baik (2008), who shows that when groups
are competing for a pure public good then a group’s total effort is obtained by the best
response of one of the groups competing in a standard two-player Tullock contest. In our
setup, for p = 0 the two groups are competing for a public good of value V , hence from
the results of Baik (2008) and the symmetric two-player Tullock contest it has to hold
that Ei = V/4. This is precisely the value of the characterized equilibrium aggregate
effort Ei = nieˆi when one substitutes p = 0 in the equilibrium effort eˆi. For p > 0 and
αi = 0 for i = A,B, the egalitarian distribution of the private part of the prize makes it
analogous to a public good but with different valuation for each group. In particular, the







Baik (2008) and the asymmetric two-player Tullock contest we know that there exist
multiple equilibria where it must hold that Ei =
V 2i Vj
(Vi+Vj)2
. Substituting for the values
of Vi and Vj in this expression one can obtain the analytical expression of Ei = nieˆi as
characterized in the proposition.
Having characterized the equilibrium in the effort stage, we can now provide the
condition such that the GSP occurs according to the following definition:
Definition 1. The Group Size Paradox (GSP) arises if and only if EA < EB.
Given the contest success function used for the competition between groups, the
previous definition is equivalent to the small group facing a higher probability of winning
than the large group. Using the above equilibrium for exogenous sharing rules, we obtain
our first result regarding the GSP:
Proposition 2. With exogenous sharing rules,
• For p = 0, the GSP never arises.
• For p ∈ (0, 1], the GSP arises if and only if
αA <
nA − nB + 2αBnA(nB − 1)
2nB(nA − 1) (2)
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Esteban and Ray (2001) assume that the private part of the prize is shared on an
egalitarian basis among group members regardless of their individual contribution, and
find that with a linear cost of effort, the GSP arises for all values of p except for the
extreme case of p = 0 (i.e., when the prize is purely public).9 If the prize exhibits no
private component, the group sharing rules are irrelevant. Hence, in the specific case
of p = 0, our setup and the one of Esteban and Ray (2001) are equivalent and both
groups win the prize with an equal probability.10 For p > 0, introducing the possibility of
(exogenous) group-specific sharing rules leads to a more nuanced result. In particular, as
can be seen from (2), for any degree of privateness of the good, the less (more) meritocratic
the sharing rule of the large (small) group, the more likely that the GSP arises.11
4 Unbounded Meritocracy
We now consider the first stage of the game where the two groups A and B choose their
sharing rules (αA, αB), and we allow for unbounded levels of meritocracy (i.e., αi ∈ [0,∞)
for i = A,B). As the sharing rules are irrelevant when the prize is a pure public good, we
assume in what follows that p > 0. While the equilibrium concept is subgame perfection,
in our formal results we present the equilibrium choice of sharing rules, as effort levels
chosen in stage two can be derived directly from Proposition 1. We assume that in each
group, the choice regarding the sharing rule is made to maximize aggregate welfare within




9Pecorino and Temimi (2008) modify the model of Esteban and Ray (2001) to a standard public good
setting, and show that their results are robust to the presence of small fixed costs of participation in the
case of a pure public good, but not in the case of a fully rival good. Furthermore, when the degree of
rivalry is sufficiently high, the introduction of small fixed costs of participation implies that collective
action must break down in large groups.
10This case is also equivalent to the collective contest with pure public goods studied by Baik (2008).
11Notice that although Proposition 2 considers the cases of p = 0 and p = (0, 1] separately, there is
no discontinuity between the two cases. One can easily verify that independently of the occurrence of
the GSP, the winning probability of both groups converges to one half as p approaches zero. The reason
we chose to separate between the two cases is that when the prize is a pure public good (i.e., p = 0),
expression (2) is not necessary since the sharing rules do not apply.
12As the aggregate welfare of group i only depends on aggregate effort, and as we know from Proposition
1 that in equilibrium aggregate effort is unique for any αi, it follows that the sharing rule αi that
maximizes the expected utility of the representative individual in a within-group symmetric equilibrium
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Proposition 3. Let p1 =
nB(nA−nB−1)
1+nB(nA−nB−1) . If the choice of sharing rules is unrestricted:
• If 0 < p ≤ p1, only group A is active and the continuum of sharing rules in the subgame










– αB ∈ [nB(1−p)+pp , nB [nA(1−p)+3p−2]−2p(nB−1)p ]
• If p > p1, both groups are active and the sharing rule for i = A,B in the unique




2ninj(ni − 1) + Aip+Bip2
p [2ninj − p(ni(2nj − 1)− nj)]
where Ai = ninj(9− 4ni)− nj(nj + 2)− 2ni and Bi = ninj(2ni − 7) + nj(nj + 3) + 3ni − 2.
The above equilibrium sharing rules for the case of a purely private prize (p = 1)
coincide with the ones found by Baik and Lee (1997). Allowing for the contested prize
to have both a public and a private component may lead to the inactivity of the small
group, as stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If the choice of sharing rules is unrestricted monopolization arises for all
p ∈ (0, p1].
Under unbounded meritocracy, monopolization arises for any strictly positive degree
of privateness smaller than the threshold p1.
13 This is in stark contrast with both the
cases of a purely public and purely private prize, for which monopolization never occurs.
However, the reasons for which both groups are active in each of these two cases differ
sharply.
One can identify two opposite effects of group size driving the previous results. On




13The results for p = 0 are not analyzed here. They can be obtained from Proposition 1.
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the contributions of their members, a larger group size implies better odds at winning
the competition between groups. In other words, conditional on having identical levels
of individual effort across groups, the large group has a higher probability of winning the
prize. On the other hand, there is a group-size deterrence effect (Nitzan, 1991). Contrary
to its public component, the private part of the prize is subject to exclusion and rivalry,
and these properties are increasingly harmful the greater the size of the group. Clearly,
the size deterrence effect vanishes when the good is purely public, while it exacerbates
when its degree of privateness increases.
For degrees of privateness lower than p1 the size deterrence effect is too weak to com-
pensate for the aggregate effort effect. Given that the level of meritocracy is unbounded,
the large group is able to select a sharing rule that places great emphasis on relative
effort (i.e., αA > 1 for all p < p1), inducing high levels of effort by its members. In turn,
the combination of high individual effort levels and a large number of contributors in
the large group discourages the small group’s members from actively taking part in the
competition (all αB in the equilibrium interval guarantees the small group’s inactivity).
When the degree of privateness exceeds p1, the size deterrence effect is strong enough
to compensate for the aggregate effort effect, so that it is optimal for the small group to
select a highly meritocratic sharing rule (i.e., αB > 1 for all p > p1) in order to induce
positive levels of effort by its members. Therefore, for degrees of privateness larger than
p1, both groups are active. In other words, even when the prize is purely private, the size
deterrence effect never dominates the aggregate effort effect to the point of excluding the
large group from the competition. That is, monopolization is always such that the small
group is inactive and occurs if and only if the prize is sufficiently public.
The absence of a size deterrence effect when the prize is purely public suggests that
we should also observe monopolization in that case. However, as shown by Baik (2008),
when the prize is purely public both groups are active and face the same probability
of winning the prize.14 Our results thus highlight an interesting discontinuity regarding
14On pure public goods, see also Riaz et al. (1995), Ursprung (1990) and Katz et al. (1990), among
others. They have shown that with a pure public good, a group with larger membership attains a winning
14
the occurrence of monopolization in collective rent seeking. Although the presence of a
mixed public-private prize constitutes an intermediate possibility between the extreme
cases of a purely private or public prize, it does not yield intermediate results in terms of
group performance. When the level of meritocracy is unbounded, an arbitrarily small and
negligible degree of privateness of the prize is sufficient to allow the large group to address
free-riding among its members and exclude the small group from the competition. If the
prize is purely public, however, this coordination mechanism is not available to the large
group, which is then unable to exploit its size advantage. That is, even though there is
no deterrence effect when the prize is a pure public good, the large group cannot exploit
the aggregate effort effect due to the large free-riding incentives among its members.
Conversely, if the prize exhibits an arbitrarily small degree of privateness, the large group
uses its sharing rule as a coordination device to address free-riding among its members.
In particular, by selecting a highly meritocratic sharing rule, the members of the large
group are able to coordinate at the minimum level of individual contributions such that
the small group retires from the contest.15
Observe that this result obtains under unbounded meritocracy (i.e., allowing for Hill-
man and Riley (1989)’s transfers within groups) and given that individuals compete
against each other within their group. It is the combination of these two factors that
prevents any member of any group from deviating. First, the high level of aggregate
effort by the large group discourages the members of the small group from being active.
Second, the members of the large (and active) group do not deviate to zero effort because
they are still competing within the group. As the sharing rule that drives monopolization
is greater than one, the transfers they would have to pay to the active members of the
probability larger than or equal to that of a smaller group. Neither monopolization nor the GSP arise
in such cases.
15This discontinuity might strike some readers as puzzling as it cannot arise in a continuous game,
by upper hemicontinuity property of the equilibrium correspondence. However, it is worth emphasizing
that two different games are played for p = 0 or p > 0. Indeed, for p > 0 we are solving a two-stage game
where sharing rules are chosen prior to the effort stage (with an action space R2+nA+nB+ ). In contrast, for
p = 0 sharing rules do not apply so that one can focus only on the single-stage effort game (with action
space RnA+nB+ ). This difference in the definition of the game and the absence of the strategic choice of
sharing rules in the case of a pure public good allow for the discontinuity.
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group prevent them from being inactive.
Observe, furthermore, that such preemptive behaviour by the large group occurs for
most degrees of privateness, as the threshold p1 is in fact very close to one.
16 Again,
such a coordination mechanism among the members of the large group is possible to the
extent that the sharing rule αi may exceed one, in which case an inactive group member
has to pay a transfer to the other (active) group members. As we shall see in the next
section, the unavailability of this mechanism prevents the occurrence of monopolization
whenever the choice of sharing rules is subject to the restriction that αi ∈ [0, 1].
We saw that when p ≥ p1, the size deterrence effect is large enough as compared to
the aggregate effort effect so that it is optimal for the small group’s members to actively
take part in the competition. As the degree of privateness increases further, so does
the strength of the size deterrence effect, ultimately giving rise to the GSP. In particular,
when the degree of privateness exceeds the threshold pGSP , the small group, besides being
active, outperforms the large group in terms of winning probabilities.
Proposition 4. With an unrestricted choice of sharing rules, the GSP arises if and only




As explained above, size deterrence is a consequence of the rivalry and exclusion
properties of private goods. Therefore, increasing the degree of privateness exacerbates
the size deterrence effect. This drives the emergence of the GSP for levels of privateness
above pGSP .
16Notice that the numerical value of p1 is large and very close to one as the size of the groups increases,
and/or when there is a large difference between group sizes. For instance, if nA = 15 and nB = 7 then
p1 = 0.98. However, this critical value of the degree of privateness can be rescaled by assuming that
the public good is congestible. This could be captured by a parameter c ∈ [0, 1) such that the utility
attributed to the public good by any member of group i is (1 − p)V/nci . In that case the critical value






ncAnB(1+nB)−ncB(ncA+nAnB) , which for the previous example rescales p1 to p
c
1 = 0.76
for c = 0.6. In order to avoid unnecessary complications in the main text, we consider the case of c = 0.
17The numerical value of pGSP is large and very close to one as the size of the groups increases,
and/or when there is a large difference between group sizes. For instance, if nA = 15 and nB = 7
then pGSP = 0.99. Again, this value can be rescaled if we assume that the public good is congestible.







, which for the previous example yields
pcGSP = 0.95 for c = 0.6.
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Figure 1: Simultaneous choice of sharing rules
Figure 1 is useful to illustrate the emergence of the GSP in further detail. When the
degree of privateness exceeds p1, both groups are active. Furthermore, the large group
implements a more meritocratic rule than the small one (αA > αB) as long as p ≤ p2.18
As a consequence of the size deterrence effect, the relative meritocracy of the large group’s
sharing rule is strictly decreasing in the degree of privateness of the prize. As the good
gets relatively more private (p > p2), it is the small group that implements the most
meritocratic sharing rule (αA < αB). However, returns to effort are still higher for the
large group’s members, so that they exert higher individual effort until a yet larger degree
of privateness is reached. From p3 on, the relative level of meritocracy in both groups
is such that the small group’s members exert higher individual effort than the members
of the large group, i.e., from p > p3 it holds that eB > eA. Finally, when the degree
of privateness reaches pGSP , the larger amount of individual effort exerted by the small
group’s members is sufficient to compensate for the smaller number of contributors, so
that the GSP arises.
18To avoid introducing more notation, we do not define formally the thresholds p2 and p3 presented in




We now solve the model assuming that the level of meritocracy is bounded. That is, the
sharing rules must be such that the allocation of the private part of the prize among group
members is at most proportional to relative contributions, i.e., αi ∈ [0, 1] for i = A,B.
As we will see, neither monopolization nor the GSP arise in that case.
Proposition 5. If the choice of sharing rules is restricted:
• If 0 < p ≤ p˚, both groups are active and the sharing rules in the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium are given by αA = αB = 1
• If p > p˚, both groups are active and the sharing rules in the unique subgame perfect




– αB = 1
The above equilibrium sharing rules for the case of a purely private prize (p = 1)
coincide with the ones found by Lee (1995).19 The constraint affecting the sharing rules
is always binding for the small group, while it is binding for the large group at low levels
of privateness.20 When p > p˚ the strength of the size deterrence effect induces the large
group to select a sharing rule such that individual rewards within the group are less than
proportional to relative contributions. As the constraints are binding in equilibrium,
restricting the choice of sharing rules clearly alter our previous results.
Proposition 6. If the choice of sharing rules is restricted, neither monopolization nor
the GSP occurs for any p ∈ [0, 1].
With bounded levels of meritocracy neither the large nor the small group can im-
plement a sharing rule that enables them to fully exploit their size advantage (i.e., size
19The equilibrium (restricted) sharing rules for the case of n groups are provided by Ueda (2002).
20The analytical expression of the threshold p˚ can be found in the Appendix.
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deterrence for the small group and aggregate effort for the large group). As a consequence,
neither monopolization nor the GSP occurs. In other words, the large (small) group needs
to select unbounded levels of meritocracy in order to fully take advantage of the aggregate
effort (size deterrence) effect. In a nutshell, it is the combination of unbounded levels of
meritocracy and intermediate degrees of privateness of the contested prize that drives the
occurrence of the two phenomena studied in this paper: monopolization and the GSP.
The restriction on the levels of meritocracy sets an upper bound on the strength of
competition by preventing the possibility of transfers within the groups. If the prize
is sufficiently private so that both groups are active (i.e., p > p1), it can be shown
that both groups’ members are strictly better off when the choice of sharing rules is
restricted. Although the GSP never takes place — and thus the large group is more
likely to win the competition— the small group’s members are better off in the restricted
version of the game given their reduced effort levels. If the prize is sufficiently public
(i.e., p < p1), we saw that under unbounded meritocracy the large group selects highly
meritocratic sharing rules so as to exclude the small group from the competition. In this
case, we showed that there exists a continuum of equilibria where the large group selects
the minimum value of αA(αB) guaranteeing the inactivity of the small group for any
admissible value of αB (Proposition 3). The small group’s members are clearly better
off under bounded meritocracy as they actively take part in the competition and thus
achieve strictly positive payoffs. Whether the large groups’ members prefer the restricted
version of the game depends on the exact equilibrium realization. Despite being inactive,
the small group’s members may select a high level of meritocracy, thereby obliging the
large groups’ members to increase their own level of meritocracy and thus their effort
levels. In such case, the large group’s members prefer the choice of sharing rules to be
restricted. Conversely, if the small group’s members select a low level of meritocracy out
of the equilibrium support, the large group’s members are better off under unbounded
meritocracy.
As the decision whether to restrict the level of meritocracy is ultimately a group’s
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internal matter, it is natural to endogenize it. To do so, one could add a third stage to our
game where prior to the choice of their sharing rules, the two groups would simultaneously
decide whether to play the restricted or unrestricted version of the game. It can then be
shown that both groups selecting unbounded levels of meritocracy is always a subgame
perfect equilibrium for all values of privateness. Moreover, the version of the game where
both groups choose to restrict their choice of sharing rules never arises as an equilibrium
given their incentives to deviate and lift the restriction.21 Hence, we believe that our
analysis of the strategic choice of sharing rules under unbounded meritocracy and the
related results on the occurrence of monopolization and the GSP are of considerable
interest.
6 Discussion
We have shown that the strategic choice of sharing rules has important implications
regarding the occurrence of both monopolization and the GSP. In particular, the feasible
meritocracy levels of the sharing rules and the degree of privateness of the contested
prize are key. On the one hand, both monopolization and the GSP can only arise with
unbounded levels of meritocracy, while on the other hand, the degree of privateness of the
prize affects these two phenomena in an opposite way. In particular, while monopolization
occurs for low degrees of privateness, the GSP arises for high degrees of privateness. In
turn, this is a consequence of the two different size effects that shape the equilibrium
of the game: the aggregate effort effect (which benefits the large group) and the size
deterrence effect (which benefits the small group). While the aggregate effort effect is
independent of the public-private composition of the contested prize, the strength of the
size deterrence effect is increasing in the degree of privateness. Therefore, as long as
the choice of sharing rules is unrestricted, the large group is able to fully exploit the
21Two more possible equilibria characterized by the equilibrium sharing rules presented in Proposition
3 and 5 are the ones such that (i) only the large group decides to restrict the choice of its sharing rule
(if p is large enough) and (ii) only the small group decides to restrict the choice of its sharing rule (if
p < p1).
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aggregate effort effect, to the point of excluding the small group from the competition for
low levels of privateness of the prize (i.e., monopolization arises). Conversely, for almost
purely private contested prizes, the small group, besides being active, even outperforms
the large group in terms of winning probabilities (i.e., the GSP arises).
The occurrence of both monopolization and the GSP is driven by the combination of
unbounded levels of meritocracy and intermediate degrees of privateness of the contested
prize. Insofar as the competition involves groups of individuals, the private or public na-
ture of the prize must be taken into account. Furthermore, considering the unrestricted
choice of group sharing rules is clearly relevant to the extent that it would always arise
endogenously as an equilibrium outcome regardless of the exact public-private composi-
tion of the prize. Yet, as this case is generally pareto-dominated by the case of bounded
meritocracy, the two groups would coordinate on the latter if they were ever given the
opportunity to collude. The resulting reduction in the strength of the competition, al-
though it does not allow the groups to fully exploit their respective size advantage, would
benefit all individuals regardless of their group membership.
We have analyzed the relationship between the size of a group and its performance in
terms of its probability of winning the prize. However, another relevant notion of group
effectiveness relates its size to per-capita payoffs. As it turns out, whenever meritocracy is
unbounded, the members of the small group achieve strictly higher expected utility than
the large group’s members when the prize is sufficiently private, and from a degree of
privateness strictly smaller than the one required for the GSP to arise. In fact, when the
prize is sufficiently private so that both groups are active, individual utility is decreasing
in the degree of privateness in the large group, while it is increasing in the small group.
For both notions of group effectiveness, therefore, the members of the small group always
outperform the members of the large group in a competition over a pure private good.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof relies on an extension of Ueda (2002). In order to
facilitate comparison, let us transform αi = 1 − αˆi. The expected utility of individual











By the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, the necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize
the unique within-team symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium are the following: (i)











− 1 ≤ 0 for all i
Similarly to Ueda (2002) we can define:
γˆi = (1− αˆi)p+ αˆi
ni
p+ (1− p)






) , which is always positive and larger than one. Then






)− 1 ≤ 0 for i = A,B.
This expression is analogous to expression (2) in Ueda (2002, p. 616), which guaran-
tees that Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 in Ueda (2002) hold in our case. Then, in our
two-groups case, from Corollary 1(b), members of group i are inactive if and only if
γˆi ≤ γˆj − 1
nˆi
, ∀i 6= j
Rewriting this condition in terms of αA, αB yields χi(αA, αB) ≥ 0 in Proposition 1.
Further, it is immediate to see that χi(αA, αB) ≥ 0 implies χj(αA, αB) < 0. Solving
the system of equations arising from the first-order conditions in the interior and corner
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solutions, we find the equilibrium effort levels e˜i, e˜j and eˆi as presented in Proposition 1
and have therefore characterized the unique within-team symmetric equilibrium.
As Baik (2008) has shown, the possibility of asymmetric equilibria may arise when
groups compete for a prize that is of a pure public good nature. We shall first argue that
whenever the prize includes at least some private component (i.e., p > 0) or when the
sharing rule is partly meritocratic (i.e., αi > 0) there exist no within-group asymmetric
equilibria (i.e., equilibria where members of group i exert different effort levels). In such
case, therefore, the symmetric equilibrium we characterized is unique.
Given that individuals are identical, the derivative of the expected utility with respect
to eki is identical for all members of group i, as it is given by
(Ei − eki)nipαi + Ej [ni + p− nip+ (−1 + ni)pαi]
(Ei + Ej)2ni
− 1
Thus, it follows that for any two members k and l of group i it cannot hold that
eki 6= eli if eki > 0 and eli > 0. Further, we can also show the non-existence of asymmetric
within-group equilibria where some of the group members are inactive. If eki = 0 for some
members of group i and eli = Ei/n˜i > 0 for the n˜i members exerting positive effort, the
first order conditions require that ∂EUki
∂eki
(eki = 0) ≤ 0 and ∂EUli∂eli = 0. One can easily verify
that ∂EUki
∂eki
(eki = 0) >
∂EUli
∂eli
for any p > 0 and αi > 0 and hence reject the possibility of
within-group asymmetric equilibria in such cases.
• Case 1: p > 0 and αi > 0 for i = A,B
Since we have shown that for p > 0 and αi > 0 for i = A,B there can be no
within-group asymmetric equilibria, we can conclude that the characterized within-group
symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
• Case 2: p = 0 or p > 0 and αi = 0 for i = A,B
For p = 0 the two groups are competing for a pure public good, hence the equilibrium
characterization arises directly from Baik (2008). For p > 0 and αi = 0 for i = A,B,
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the egalitarian distribution of the private good makes the prize equivalent to a public
good with different valuation for the members of different groups. In particular, the







using these valuations for each group the characterization of the equilibrium also follows
immediately from Baik (2008). Therefore, for p = 0 or p > 0 and αi = 0 for i =
A,B, we can follow Baik (2008) and conclude that there exist multiple within-group
asymmetric equilibria, all of them characterized by the same level of aggregate effort as
in the symmetric equilibrium, i.e., Ei = nieˆi (substituting the corresponding value for
p = 0 or αi = 0 for i = A,B).
• Case 3: p > 0, αi = 0 and αj > 0
The previous extension of Ueda (2002) guarantees the existence of the within-group sym-
metric equilibrium. As αj > 0, we know that there exists no within-group j asymmetric
equilibrium. Then, as αi = 0, Lemma 3 in Baik (2008) guarantees that given a within-
group i symmetric equilibrium yielding aggregate effort Ei = nieˆi > 0, any alternative
distribution of individual effort within group i also constitutes an equilibrium as long as
it also leads to aggregate effort Ei = nieˆi.
If αj is such that χi(0, αj) ≥ 0, then group i is inactive and thus the equilibrium
is unique and symmetric within the groups. If αj is such that that χi(0, αj) < 0, then
both groups are active and there exist multiple within-group i asymmetric equilibria with
Ei = nieˆi (with the value of αi = 0).
Proof of Proposition 2. By definition the GSP takes place if and only if EA < EB. Con-
sider the equilibrium effort levels when both groups are active. Then E˜A = nAeˆA < E˜B =





A(αA, αB) = − [nB(1− p) + p] [nA(1− p) + p+ (nA − 1)pαA]− (nB − 1) [nA(1− p) + p] pαB < 0,
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B(αA, αB) = nB(1− 2αA) + nA [2nB(αA − αB) + 2αB − 1]
and C = [nA(2nB(p− 1)− p)− nBp]2 > 0
The above expression is equal to zero for p = 0, hence the GSP does not arise in that case.
For other values of p we need to consider the sign of each expression. Since C is always
positive and A(αA, αB) is always negative, the GSP arises if and only if B(αA, αB) < 0,
which can be rearranged as
αA <
nA − nB + 2αBnA(nB − 1)
2nB(nA − 1)
Proof of Proposition 3.
As we have pointed out in footnote 12 maximizing the expected utility of the represen-
tative individual of group i in the within-group symmetric equilibrium also maximizes the
aggregate welfare of group i. Therefore, in this proof and the subsequent ones, we focus
on the sharing rule αi that maximizes the expected utility of the representative individual
in group i in the within-group symmetric equilibrium. We denote by EU i(αA, αB) the
expected utility of the representative individual in group i.
From Proposition 1 and the equilibrium effort levels if both groups are active, the
expected utility for the representative individual of group i = A,B is given by
EˆU i(αA, αB) =
[ninj+((αi−1)(ni−1)nj+αjni(1−nj))p]V
ni[njp+ni(2nj(1−p)+p)]2 [ni(2ni − 1)nj − Ap+B(ni − 1)p
2]
where
A = ni(1− αj − ni) + nj(1− αi) + ni(4ni + αi + αj − 5)nj
B = αi(nj − 1) + αj(nj − 1) + (ni − 1)(2nj − 1)
From Proposition 1 and the equilibrium effort levels if only group i is active, the
expected utility for group i is given by
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E˜U i(αi) = V − (ni − 1)(ni + αi)
n2i
pV
If group i is inactive then from Proposition 1 it must be that χi(αi, αj) > 0. Notice
that χi(αi, αj) + χj(αi, αj) = −nA [2nB(1− p) + p] − nBp < 0. Hence if χi(αi, αj) > 0
then χj(αi, αj) < 0, meaning that if i is inactive j must be active. Therefore if i is
inactive it holds that EUi(αi) = 0.











χj(αi, αj) is strictly increasing with respect to αi it holds that χj(αi, αj) > 0 for all values
αi > αi2(αj) and hence αi2(αj) is the minimum value of αi that guarantees that members
of group j are inactive in equilibrium given any αj.
Solving χi(αi3(αj), αj) = 0 we define αi3(αj) =
njp+ni[nj+αjp−(αj+1)njp]
(1−ni)njp . Given that
χi(αi, αj) is strictly decreasing with respect to αi then for all α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)] it is true
that χi(α˙i, αj) > 0 and thus group i is inactive.
Comparing the expressions of αi2(αj) and αi3(αj) we have that αi2(αj) > αi3(αj) and
therefore we can write the expected utility as follows:
EUi(αi) =

0 if 0 ≤ αi ≤ αi3(αj)
EˆU i(αA, αB) if αi3(αj) < αi < αi2(αj)
E˜U i(αi) if αi ≥ αi2(αj)
Notice that EUi(αi) is a continuous function since
limαi→αi3(αj) EˆU i(αA, αB) = 0 and limαi→αi2(αj) EˆU i(αA, αB) = E˜U i(αi)
Moreover, the second derivative of EˆU i(αA, αB) is
2nB(nA−1)2[nB(p−1)−p]p2V
nA[nBp+nA(2nB(1−p)+p)]2 < 0. Thus,
EˆU i(αA, αB) is a strictly concave function in the unrestricted domain αi ∈ (−∞,+∞)




Finally, notice that E˜U i(αi) is strictly decreasing with respect to αi.
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If αi1(αj) ≤ αi3(αj) then for all αi > αi3(αj) the expected utility EUi(αi) is strictly
decreasing and hence negative. Therefore, EUi(αi) takes its maximal value of zero for all
values α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)]. Comparing the analytical expressions of αi1(αj) and αi3(αj) it is
true that αi1(αj) ≤ αi3(αj) if and only if
αj ≥ nj
nj − 1
ni(1− p) + p
p
= αˆj
If αi1(αj) ≥ αi2(αj) and given that E˜U i(αi) is strictly decreasing with respect to
αi then EUi(αi) has a unique global maximum at αi2(αj). Comparing the analytical
expressions of αi1(αj) and αi2(αj) it is true that αi1(αj) ≥ αi2(αj) if and only if
αj ≤ nj[ni(1− p) + 3p− 2]− 2p
(nj − 1)p = α˜j
If αi3(αj) < αi1(αj) < αi2(αj) then EUi(αi) has a unique global maximum at αi1(αj).
Summing up, the best response of group i can be written as:
αi(αj) =

αi2(αj) for αj ≤ α˜j
αi1(αj) for α˜j < αj < αˆj
α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)] for αj ≥ αˆj
We now consider the nine possible combinations of the two groups’ best responses:
Case 1: i = A,B plays αi1(αj)




2ninj(ni − 1) + Aip+Bip2
p [2ninj − p(ni(2nj − 1)− nj)]
where Ai = ninj(9− 4ni)− nj(nj + 2)− 2ni and Bi = ninj(2ni − 7) + nj(nj + 3) + 3ni − 2.
From the best responses, this is an equilibrium if and only if α˜i < αi < αˆi for i = A,B,
which is true as long as
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p >
nB(nA − nB − 1)
1 + nB(nA − nB − 1) = p1
Hence, both groups being active is an equilibrium if and only if p > p1.
Case 2: i = A,B plays αi2(αj)
If i = A,B plays αi2(αj), there is no solution, as the best responses are two parallel
lines with positive slope.
Case 3: A plays αA1(αB) and B plays αB2(αA)
If A plays αA1(αB) and B plays αB2(αA), it yields the following sharing rules:









From the best responses, this is an equilibrium if and only if αA 6 α˜A and α˜B <
αB < αˆB. As the sharing rules above are such that αB > αˆB, the latter condition is never
satisfied. Hence we do not reach an equilibrium.
Case 4: A plays αA2(αB) and B plays αB1(αA)










From the best responses, this is an equilibrium if and only if αB 6 α˜B and α˜A <
αA < αˆA. As the sharing rules above are such that αA > αˆA, the latter condition is never
satisfied. Hence we do not reach an equilibrium.
Case 5: A plays αA1(αB) and B plays α˙B ∈ [0, αB3(αA)]
If A plays αA1(αB) and B plays α˙B ∈ [0, αB3(αA)], we are at an equilibrium if and
only if αA > αˆA and α˜B < αB < αˆB, which is never satisfied. Let αA = αA1(αB). Then,
the condition αB < αB3(αA) reduces to αB < α˜B, hence we reach a contradiction.
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Case 6: A plays α˙A ∈ [0, αA3(αB)] and B plays αB1(αA)
If A plays α˙A ∈ [0, αA3(αB)] and B plays αB1(αA), we are at an equilibrium if and
only if α˜A < αA < αˆA and αB > αˆB, which is never satisfied. Let αB = αB1(αA). Then,
the condition αA < αA3(αB) reduces to αA < α˜A, hence we reach a contradiction.
Case 7: i = A,B plays α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)]
If i = A,B plays α˙i ∈ [0, αi3(αj)], we immediately reach a contradiction, as αA 6
αA3(αB) and αB 6 αB3(αA) cannot hold simultaneously. The condition αA 6 αA3(αB) is
equivalent to
αB >
nB [nA − (1− αA)(nA − 1)p]
nA(nB − 1)p
Then, we have that
αB3(αA) > nB [nA−(1−αA)(nA−1)p]nA(nB−1)p if and only if p >
2nAnB
2nAnB−nA−nB > 1
Hence we reach a contradiction.
Case 8: A plays αA2(αB) and B plays α˙B ∈ [0, αB3(αA)]
If A plays αA2(αB) and B plays α˙B ∈ [0, αB3(αA)], we are at an equilibrium if and
only if αA > αˆA and αB 6 α˜B, which holds if and only if αB ∈ [nB(1−p)+pp , α˜B] and p 6 p1.
Case 9: A plays α˙A ∈ [0, αA3(αB)] and B plays αB2(αA)
If A plays α˙A ∈ [0, αA3(αB)] and B plays αB2(αA), we are at an equilibrium if and
only if αA 6 α˜A and αB > αˆB, which is never satisfied. Let αB = αB2(αA). Then,
αB > αˆB reduces to αA > [nA(1− p) + p] /p. As α˜A < [nA(1− p) + p] /p, the conditions
for an equilibrium are never satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 4. Clearly, if the small group is inactive, the GSP cannot occur. If
p > p1, from Proposition 2, the GSP arises if and only if
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αA <
nA − nB + 2αBnA(nB − 1)
2nB(nA − 1)
Substituting for the equilibrium value of αi (i = A,B) from Proposition 3, the above
condition reduces to
(nA − nB) [2nAnB(1− p)− p]
2(nA − 1)nBp < 0
which holds if and only if p > 2nAnB
1+2nAnB
= pGSP .
Proof of Proposition 5. We can obtain group i’s best response with restricted sharing
rules by adding the constraint αi ≤ 1 for i = A,B in the best response with unrestricted
sharing rules derived in the proof of Proposition 3.
First, observe that αˆi > 1 for i = A,B and ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, α˙i is not part of
the best response with restricted sharing rules. As shown in the proof of Proposition 3,
αi1(αj) is chosen over αi2(αj) if and only if αi1(αj) < αi2(αj). By taking this into account
together with the new restriction αi ≤ 1, one can write the best response for i = A,B
and j 6= i as:
αi(αj) = min{αi1(αj), αi2(αj), 1}
To find the solution we have to consider the nine combinations that arise from the
previous best response. We can easily eliminate several combinations:
• If i = A,B plays αi1(αj), the sharing rule of each group is the one obtained in Case 1
in the proof of Proposition 3. As the value of αB always exceeds one we can discard
this combination as a solution.
• If i = A,B plays αi2(αj), there is no solution, as the best responses are parallel lines
(Case 2 in the proof of Proposition 3).




ni [nj(1− p) + p]
(ni − 1)p > 1
Thus, i and j playing αi1(αj) and αj2(αi) for i = A,B and j 6= i never constitutes an
equilibrium.
• As αi2(1) = nB(nB−1)p > 1 for i = A,B, there is no solution with i and j playing αi2(αj)
and αj = 1 for i = A,B and j 6= i.
• Let αA = 1 and αB(αA) = αB1(1). By evaluating αB1(1) at p = 1 we obtain that
αB(1) =
2nAnB−nA−nB




2p2(nA+p−nAp)2 < 0 for all
p ∈ (0, 1], it follows that αB1(1) > 1 for any p ∈ [0, 1] .
After eliminating the previous seven combinations we are now left with the two cases
where αB = 1 and αA = min{αA1(1), 1}. By substitution of αB = 1 we obtain the

















As p1 (with the plus sign) is larger than one, we further ignore it. Thus we let p˚ = p2 <






for all p ∈ (0, 1], it follows that αA1(1) > 1 for any p ∈ [0, p˚). Therefore, at the unique
equilibrium we have
• αA = αB = 1 for p ∈ (0, p˚]
• αA = αA1(1) and αB = 1 for p ∈ (p˚, 1]
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Substituting these equilibrium values in the relevant expression obtained in Proposi-
tion 1, we find that χi(αA, αB) < 0 for i = A,B and for all p ∈ (0, 1]. Hence in equilibrium
both groups are active.
Proof of Proposition 6. From Proposition 2, for any p ∈ (0, 1] the GSP arises if and only
if αA <
nA−nB+2αBnA(nB−1)
2nB(nA−1) . We know from Proposition 5 that αA = αB = 1 for p ∈ (0, p˚],
hence the GSP arises if and only if nA−nB
nAnB−nB < 0 which never holds given that nA > nB.
For p ∈ (p˚, 1] we know that αB = 1 and αA = αA1(1). Taking the equilibrium value
of αA(1) for p = 1 yields αA(1) =
2nAnB−nA−nB
2nB(nA−1) . From Proposition 2, the GSP arises
at p = 1 if and only if 2nAnB−nA−nB
2nB(nA−1) <
nA−nB+2nA(nB−1)
2nB(nA−1) which never holds given that




all p ∈ (0, 1], it follows that the GSP does not arise for any p ∈ (p˚, 1).
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